Kemeny's rule is one of the most studied and well-known voting schemes with various important applications in computational social choice and biology. Recently, Kemeny's rule was generalized via a set-wise approach by Gilbert et. al. This paradigm presents interesting advantages in comparison with Kemeny's rule since not only pairwise comparisons but also the discordance between the winners of subsets of three alternatives are also taken into account in the definition of the $3$-wise Kendall-tau distance between two rankings. In spite of the NP-hardness of the 3-wise Kemeny problem which consists of computing the set of $3$-wise consensus rankings, namely rankings whose total $3$-wise Kendall-tau distance to a given voting profile is minimized, we establish in this paper several generalizations of the Major Order Theorems, as obtained by Milosz and Hamel for Kemeny's rule, for the $3$-wise Kemeny voting schemes to achieve a substantial search space reduction by efficiently determining in polynomial time the relative orders of pairs of alternatives. Essentially, our theorems quantify precisely the nontrivial property that if the preference for an alternative over another one in an election is strong enough, not only in the head-to-head competition but even when taking into account one or two more alternatives, then the relative order of these two alternatives in all $3$-wise consensus rankings must be as expected. As an application, we also obtain an improvement of the Major Order Theorems for Kememy's rule. Moreover, we show that the well-known $3/4$-majority rule of Betzler et al. for Kemeny's rule is only valid in general for elections with no more than $5$ alternatives with respect to the $3$-wise Kemeny scheme. Several simulations and tests of our algorithms on real-world and uniform data are provided.

The important Kemeny problem, which consists of computing median consensus rankings of an election with respect to the Kemeny voting rule, admits important applications in biology and computational social choice and was generalized recently via an interesting setwise approach by Gilbert et. al. Our first results establish optimal quantitative extensions of the Unanimity property and the well-known $3/4$-majority rule of Betzler et al. for the classical Kemeny median problem. Moreover, by elaborating an exhaustive list of quantified axiomatic properties (such as the Condorcet and Smith criteria, the $5/6$-majority rule, etc.) of the $3$-wise Kemeny rule where not only pairwise comparisons but also the discordance between the winners of subsets of three candidates are also taken into account, we come to the conclusion that the $3$-wise Kemeny voting scheme induced by the $3$-wise Kendall-tau distance presents interesting advantages in comparison with the classical Kemeny rule. For example, it satisfies several improved manipulation-proof properties. Since the $3$-wise Kemeny problem is NP-hard, our results also provide some of the first useful space reduction techniques by determining the relative orders of pairs of alternatives. Our works suggest similar interesting properties of higher setwise Kemeny voting schemes which justify and compensate for the more expensive computational cost than the classical Kemeny scheme.